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Abstract
This article examines the privatization of telegraphy in the British Empire from the perspective of Gibraltar, an overseas
territory in the Mediterranean. While the history of international telegraphy is typically written from a world-systems
perspective, this article presents a key methodological critique of the use of collections spread across many institutions
and colonies: archival satellites are not simply reducible to parts of a scattered whole, as archival collections are them-
selves curations of socially-positioned understandings of Empire. This is especially true of the “girdle round the world”
that was British telegraphy. At a meta-historical level, individual archival collections of the global British telegraphy system
can be read as histories of colonial administrators’ geographically- and socially- situated perspectives on Empire—namely
through what archives have, and have not, preserved. I demonstrate how the documents about telegraphy collected and
maintained in the Gibraltar National Archives reflect pre- and post-WorldWar I English, anti-Liberal colonial administrators’
and military officials’ fear that privatization was an opening salvo against the democratic web that held the last vestiges of
Empire together.
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1. Introduction
In 1933, Cable and Wireless LTD began what was a tu-
multuous cohabitation with the British postal service in
Gibraltar. The telegraphy company was initially forced
to conform to the reduced hours, limited housekeeping,
and staffing sacrifices required of the Main Street Postal
Office amidst the post-World War I austerity measures.
Heated exchanges regarding democracy and public inter-
est ensued between the colonial postmaster H. G. Jessop
and L. C. Hopecraft, the manager of Cable and Wireless,
LTD. Despite Jessop’s rhetorical victories in the names of
honor, glory and public interest for Gibraltar, however,
the private economic interests of the Cable and Wire-
less, entangled as theywerewith the political interests of
politicians in the UK, gained the economic high-ground.
The immediate result: a grille funded by the local govern-
ment (Figure 1) to block off the postal office, allowing Ca-
ble andWireless to remain open in a government-funded
building—while the government servicewas forced close
by post-war austerity measures. Eventually, the Postal
Office was nearly expelled completely from its own build-
ing, and a significant amount of funding was redirected
to Cable and Wireless, LTD.
Telegraphy in Gibraltar became a primary means for
military communication in the years preceding World
War I, replacing postal carrier and carrier pigeon as the
most secure and efficient way of moving intelligence
throughout the British Empire. Gibraltar, importantly,
served as the node throughwhich the Eastern and South-
ern empire was connected to the metropole via the In-
dian cable (a line that ran from Falmouth to Malta to
Egypt, operated by one of Pender’s many international
cartel operations). Following the war, telegraphy began
to take on a more commercial role by communicating
to private ships; while the military owned the infrastruc-
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Figure 1. Gibraltar post office brass-wire grille schematics, 3 February 1954.
ture of telegraphic communication, the colonial state
and entrepreneurs sent messages through a commer-
cial service, then called The Eastern Telegraph Limited,
closely monitored by British Intelligence. Between the
years of 1914 and 1944, this commercial service had cy-
cled through 10 different names, at least 20 different
heads and leaders, each of whom were called any num-
ber of titles—first superintendent, then director, then
manager, indicative of telegraphy’s transformation from
state, to public, to corporate entity.
This article examines the historical implications of
privatized telegraphy on Commonwealth postal service
in the British Mediterranean from the perspective of
Gibraltar, an overseas territory that precipitated the can-
nibalization of public services thought to be core to
democracy (to the English colonial administrators who
ran it) in the name of “recovery” after World War II. I ar-
gue that telegraphy was the locus of a post-World War
I struggle between British aristocrats, Gibraltarian mer-
chants, and English liberals, which marked an economic
transition that reverberates into the contemporary mo-
ment. This claim comes by way of a secondary method-
ological argument: in general, archives are not capable
of creating a “global” historical account of any commu-
nication institution, let alone as it regards telegraphy.
Using historical anthropological approaches to archives
that contextualize the practice of archiving, this arti-
cle demonstrates how Gibraltar’s collection of archival
documents give not only a history of telegraphy, but a
story about Gibraltar’s colonial administration’s percep-
tion of and perspective on the relationship between colo-
nial administration, class hierarchy, colonial legitimacy,
and communication capitalism. Historians, then, must
engage in a meta-historical practice as well: documents
were institutionalized by Gibraltar’s officials in order to
curate a narrative about privatization as an incursion on
the democratic web that held the last vestiges of Em-
pire together.
2. The Telegraphic History of Archiving Telegraphy
Gibraltar is a small 2.5 sq. mi. territory located on the
Iberian Peninsula that became a British Crown Territory
in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht, and remains a British
overseas territory today. Gibraltar was an asset to the
British principally for controlling access to the Mediter-
ranean. In 1727, considering various European conflicts
(e.g., the War of Austrian Succession, the Anglo–Mysore
Wars, the coming Napoleonic Wars) Gibraltar was refor-
tified and re-weaponized as a necessary asset to the
BritishWarDepartment. Repairs of similar scalewere not
undertaken again until just prior to World War I. By that
time, an immigrant civilian population had also taken up
residence in Gibraltar. Two bodies governed this group
of individuals: the colonial administration (principally a
governor and colonial secretary appointed by and from
the Royal Army, chargedwith ruling citizens on the King’s
behalf) and the Admiralty (typically a senior Naval com-
mander charged with control over military operations
and personnel, answering to the secretary of state of
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the colonies).1 In addition tomodernizing the armament,
garrison, and weaponry in 1907, these two governing
bodies initiated the widespread installation of electric-
ity in military establishments, including those commer-
cial civilian establishments where military personnel ate
and drank. Alongside this, commercial telegraphy was of-
ficially institutionalized on the peninsula, plugging Gibral-
tar into the commercial “girdle round the world” (Barty-
King, 1980; see also Winseck & Pike, 2007).
Through the commercialization of the girdle, class hi-
erarchies were carved into the colonies connected by
telecommunications infrastructure. As Bernard Porter
(2006) remarks, the post-World War I empire was a
zone of conflict between an emerging capitalist class and
descendants of the historically-grounded aristocracy, it-
self constantly in struggle over who was “truly” English.
While the aristocracy was believed to have “stayed at
home” to govern in cabinet positions, its lowest-valued
members were typically sent throughout the Mediter-
ranean colonies in service of those offices, or as mil-
itary commanders without military power—creating a
community of resistance to liberalism that strategized
around, among other institutions, telegraphy. As the
dwindling aristocracy stepped away from ruling em-
pire, they devoted energy to training the upper middle
class, themselves aspirationally, if not previously consan-
guineously, aristocratic, to run the empire from an aristo-
cratic epistemology that centered moral duty in Empire.
To the aristocracy, this small group of the upper middle
class “made the best colonial administrators precisely be-
cause they could rise above the sordidmotives that were
attributed to the commercial bourgeoisie” (Porter, 2006,
p. 61). The petty aristocracy and upper middle class of-
ficials in places like Gibraltar, regardless of pedigree or
education, were viewed as incompetent figureheads at
best, there simply to sign colonial directives pushed by
theirmore established and successful kinsmen at home.2
Confident of their place in society, by the end of World
War I the aristocratic cabinet ministers at home came
to happily collaborate with capitalists abroad, alienating
the lower aristocratic and upper-middle class outcasts
who continued to be committed to Empire as a service
to the world by the State. The history of telegraphy in
Gibraltar, then, is a story about capitalism’s attempts to
replace “old” money imperialism with globalized busi-
ness to build Great Britain’s next age of greatness.
Just as the history of telegraphy in Gibraltar is
grounded in a complex class politics, so too does the
archival preservation of telegraphy history reflect this
struggle. Anthropologist Nicholas Dirks has argued that
archives are “that primary site of state monumental-
ity…the very institution that canonized, crystallized, and
classified the knowledge required by the state even as
it made this knowledge available for subsequent gen-
erations in the cultural form of a neutral repository of
the past” (Dirks, 2002, p. 61). As admiralty, colonial gov-
ernors, and capitalists fought over telecommunications
ownership, so too did they fight over how telegraphy
would be represented in the metropolitan monument to
the British Empire. The narrative about telegraphy con-
tained in the National Archive, then, is more a narrative
composed about the political struggles of state imagi-
naries in the core than telegraphy as it ran throughout
the peripheries.
Yet, Great Britain’s smaller State archives, such as
that in Gibraltar, which continue to escape any over-
sight from archival authorities, could institutionalize lo-
cal administrators’ perceptions of how telegraphy was
stolen from Gibraltar at the twilight of aristocratic rule.
Although “the colonial archive was not just the record of
the colonial state but also the repository of the sources
for an imperial history whose public was the metropole
rather than the colony” (Dirks, 2002, p. 63), Gibraltar’s
archives tell a story of a colony where its administrators
felt “shut out” from the process of deciding the best
directions for Empire. More directly, then, while docu-
ments may hold content about telegraphy, the pragmat-
ics of their archiving (and the decision not to archive
certainmaterials) Gibraltar’s colonial administrators’ per-
ceived slight against their ruling birthright; a slight that
was facilitated by the domestic aristocracy’s collusion
with liberal internationalism. In short, the history of
telegraphy according to Gibraltar (the narrative that a
state tells about infrastructure and colonialism) is an ut-
terance separate from, and frequently contradicting, the
history captured by collections at the National Archives.
Thismarks amethodological problem relatively unad-
dressed in media history. While historians scour multiple
archives to piece together histories fromdocuments scat-
tered around the world, they often forget that these doc-
uments are not so much part of a global whole as they
are the materialization qua preservation of local colonial
histories from grounded and conflicting perspectives on
telegraphy’s promise and place in imperial state-making.
This is a problem at a disciplinary level, as well. Media
history as a practice was grounded in the professional
archiving of corporatemedia entities, where institutional
historians focused on the storing and sometimes preser-
vation ofmaterials—notwhat the keeping of thosemate-
rials necessarily meant (Startt & Sloan, 1989). The dom-
inant positivist paradigm of classical historicism (which
dominated lay and administrative archiving) largely ig-
nored the various turns of historiographic debates, from
Marxist Historicism to French Annales to Italian Micro-
history to the American and French Linguistic turn (to
name just a few). And, without historians to bring these
1 There is a terminological problem here: The secretary of state of the colonies is sometimes given in shorthand as the colonial secretary. In Gibraltar,
colonial secretary is the name of the position called Lieutenant Governor in other spaces. In this paper, I use the full title for the secretary of state, and
colonial secretary for the local lieutenant governor.
2 While Empire provided an upwardly aspirational middle and artisanal class with forms of education that would lead to prestige-generating jobs, it was
supervised by the lower rungs of the aristocracy (whether aristocratic proper or uppermiddle-class proxies), whose higher achieving kinsmen and peers
remained at home to direct the empire from afar.
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perspectives into the field of media and communica-
tion studies, subfields like cultural/critical media stud-
ies and media sociology have largely ignored debates
about the nature and social production of historical time
and artifacts.
In what follows, my argument is not that there is
one undisputable history of telegraphy that we have ac-
cess to via primary sources contained at either archive.
Rather, I simply demonstrate the history preserved in
the selected archiving of documents in Gibraltar, and ar-
gue that this collection reflects more about the strug-
gles of administrators than an objective and true history.
In other words, the history of telegraphy contained in
the Gibraltar archives preserve a struggle over the com-
munication infrastructure necessary for modern state-
making. As becomes clear, the Gibraltar Archives repre-
sent the voices of an oft forgotten resistance to the priva-
tization of public communication infrastructure, namely
that of an anti-Liberal military and civilian colonial aris-
tocracy doing the work of (and not simply legislating)
making empire.
3. Democracy and Telegraphy in Gibraltar
Wireless telegraphy (W. T.) in Gibraltar was originally the
property and service of the military.3 In 1904, regula-
tion of telegraphy fell under the Summary Conviction Or-
dinance of 1885, sections 37–40, “Carrier Pigeons and
Wireless Telegraphy Apparatus” (Gibraltar Archival Doc-
ument, 1922b). Under this legislation, all long-distance
transmissions in fortificationswere strictly under the con-
trol of the British military: the messaging apparatus, the
service provided, and the employees who received and
sentmessages fell under control of the Colonial PostMas-
ter, who reported directly to the Admiralty and Colo-
nial Governor in Gibraltar. This norm, established while
the War and Colonial Department (1801–1854) oversaw
the colonies and dependencies, remained in place when
the supervision of colonial governors was transferred to
the colonial office (1854–1966). Under various schemes,
telegraphy became a mixed private-public endeavor on
occasion, until World War I.
On the heels of theWorldWar IDefence of the Realm
Act (DORA) in September 1914, which gave the military
total control over any publicly- or privately-owned infras-
tructure that would aid in the war effort, the British Ad-
miralty claimed total control over inbound and outbound
communications. As a colony where the fortress came
first (Finlayson, 1996), the Great War had required so
much labor and communication time that any commer-
cial service was completely disregarded by December
1914. Tomediate the effects of total military control over
telegraphy, the Colonial Governor’s office proposed that
a secondary station, the “Windmill Hill telegraphy sta-
tion”, be completely leased to the Colonial Government,
who would in turn allow Eastern Telegraph Company to
use the facilities for commercial service—the Eastern
Telegraph Company had always used colonial and mili-
tary infrastructure to provide their service in Gibraltar,
and thus existed only insofar as the British state allowed
it to (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1914).
The secretary of state of the colonies, siding with the
Admiralty, refused this proposal for a private, commer-
cial service twice, first in December 1914 and then revis-
ing his stance (but not his decision) in May 1915.
The first refusal was on the grounds that “Owing to
possibly closing for Naval purpose and shortage of op-
erators, Windmill Hill W. T. Station cannot be placed at
disposal of colonial government at present” (Gibraltar
Archival Document, 1914). While “naval use” remains
ambiguous in the archival documents, the admiralty is
clearly concerned with labor. A well-paying commercial
service might have seized the most qualified telegraph
operators in Gibraltar from the military, or rendered
conscripted operators resentful. Other documents argue
that a commercial station could also attract spies in-
tending to use the privatized equipment to undermine
British control.
The secretary of state’s second refusal camebetween
January and May 1915, only recorded in a précis of com-
munication exchanges regarding telegraphy written by
the colonial secretary in 1930 (Gibraltar Archival Docu-
ment, 1930b). According to this précis, the admiralty be-
lieved the commercial station would also cause “interfer-
ence” with the military W. T. stations. However, a change
in admiralty leadership later in 1915 created the poten-
tial for changes in telegraphy station ownership. The new
Senior Naval Officer (SNO) Admiral Borck was “informed
of arrangements contemplated and a review of the sit-
uation given to him: his opinion requested on the sub-
ject, particularly as regards “interference” fromother sta-
tions in vicinity”. By June 1915, however, the commer-
cial proposal was abandoned both by the Eastern Teleg-
raphy Company, who had been conversing with Marconi
Wireless Telegraphy Company about gutting older pub-
lic buildings and infusing them with the new Marconi
technology. The reason for their abandonment of this
issue, according to the colonial secretary and governor,
is “owing to impossibility of non-interference with Naval
W. T. work”. Admiral Borck responded that this was for
the best, as Gibraltar’s primary telegraphy station, Eu-
ropa Station, could not possiblymonitor and censor com-
mercial messages in addition to other naval duties in the
future: “the working of more than one wave-length by
one station being unsuitable” (Gibraltar Archival Docu-
ment, 1915a).
Eastern Telegraphy Company’s abandonment of the
use of state infrastructure occurred against the property
laws of wartime Great Britain. In 1915, DORAmeant that
all forms of infrastructure, especially state-subsidized in-
frastructure, could be coopted by the military, which
would result in heavy business losses for the Eastern
3 Telegraph was originally privatized in Great Britain, which came to an end in 1870 in the UK. However, given Gibraltar’s primary function as a military
base, and not a colony proper (i.e. an imperial relationship), the infrastructure had always belonged to the State.
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Telegraphy Company. The enlistment of Marconi by East-
ern Telegraph Company suggested that the companywas
considering a makeover of the then current technology,
to increase the efficiency, and thus profit, of telegraphy.
However, had the Eastern Telegraph Company become
more powerful in communication than the state itself,
their W. T. station would have become a prime target
for military seizure under DORA. As stated in Clause B of
Section 1 of DORA, theMajesty in Council, or anymilitary
member acting on his behalf, would take any means nec-
essary to “secure the safety of any means of communi-
cation” (DORA, 1914). In short, Eastern Telegraphy Com-
pany abandoned their pursuit of a telegraph station be-
cause they refused to build new communications infras-
tructure for inevitable military seizure.
Despite the Eastern Telegraph Company’s abandon-
ment of the project, the colonial secretary pressed on
with the need for a commercial wireless station. In Octo-
ber 1915, he requested the admiralty consult and obtain
an expert opinion on the question of employing multiple
wavelengths from a station. Additionally, to sweeten the
deal for the admiralty, he stated in his message to Ad-
miral Borck that the citizens and government would sub-
sidize the military’s use (and monitoring) of the Eastern
Telegraphy Company’s new Marconi technology (Gibral-
tar Archival Document, 1915b).
Privatization, according to the colonial secretary,
would lessen the military’s financial burden of providing
communication infrastructure for itself and surrounding
civilian labor force. Going one step further, the Governor
suggested that the “Admiralty’s responsibility should be
extended to financial control and that any expenditure in-
volved should be defrayed from Admiralty Votes, the in-
terests of the Admiralty and Colonial Government not be-
ing regarded as divergent” (Gibraltar Archival Document,
1915b). In a follow-up letter to the secretary of state of
the colonies from the Admiralty dated December 1915,
the Admiralty notes that the issue of multiple wave-
lengths had not been considered—perhaps because it
was a fabricated non-issue—and that the use ofWindmill
Hill station by the Colonial Government is “anticipated
to provide a service more efficient than could be ob-
tained through any private company” (Gibraltar Archival
Document, 1915c). In January 1916, the station was re-
opened by the Admiralty for limited, well-monitored
and often censored, private and commercial purposes.
However, by August 1917, the Admiralty closed the sta-
tion, greatly reducing commercial service to government
needs only until well after the war (Gibraltar Archival
Document, n.d.).
In July 1922, four years afterWorldWar I and the fear
of the DORA, the colonial governmentmade a significant
pivot in its own position regarding privatization. The Ad-
miralty proposed constructing a new W. T. station at the
South of Rock Battery, abandoning the North Front Sta-
tion. As the Admiralty wrote in a telegraph to the sec-
retary of state of the colonies, “Enquiry whether Colo-
nial Government would be prepared to make an offer
for the present W. T. Station and to operate it for com-
mercial purposes” (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1922a).
Contacted assumedly by the secretary of state, the colo-
nial secretary responded as such on 6 October 1922:
I have the honour to state that I consider the main-
tenance of a wireless station here, available for com-
mercial purposes, to be of considerable importance to
themercantile community. At the same time, I should
hesitate to make an offer on the part of the Colo-
nial Government for the purchase of the present Rock
Wireless Telegraph station with a view to operating it
as a commercial station since Government methods
do not, generally speaking, lend themselves to com-
mercial enterprises of this kind, nor has Government
the expert knowledge required to make it a success.
I would therefore suggest that the Eastern Telegraph
Company might be approached with a view to ascer-
tainingwhether theywouldmake an offer to purchase
and operate the Admiralty’s Wireless Station. If how-
ever the Company is unwilling to do so on reason-
able terms, I should be prepared to consider making
an offer on the part of the Colonial Government, as
a commercial Wireless Station here would certainly
be of benefit to the trade of the port, and if properly
managed, should pay its way. (Gibraltar Archival Doc-
ument, 1922c)
No longer interested in state run infrastructure with
private service, the colonial administration argued for
state-facilitated private investment in the entirety of
communications—a clear, early example of the State’s di-
vestment of nationalized infrastructure. Either the East-
ern Telegraph Company would buy the telegraph com-
pany, and the entire system would be privatized, or the
colonial administration would buy it, and as stated in a
private communication dated 12 October 1922, would
“make considerable concessions” (i.e., hand it over) to
the Eastern Telegraph Company, because it would prove
“of benefit to both merchant and citizen” (Gibraltar
Archival Document, 1922d).
The war office agreed with hesitation. By the end of
September 1924, The Committee for Imperial Defense
noted that communication stations have become a nec-
essary part of the British military complex, but that they
have also come to be expensive tomaintain during times
of peace. In a circular, the Committee states:
It is clear that the cost of, and time required, to re-
condition stations that have not been kept in good or-
der by continuous work makes it most unwise to al-
low stations that will be required in war to drop out
of use. Nor should important Dominions and colonies
be isolated and dependent solely on cable communi-
cation at critical periods. It is therefore important to
have the largest possible number of W/T stations in
operation in peace time consistent with economy. To
meet the interest on capital charges and the cost of
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maintenance it is desirable to get what assistance is
possible from commercial work, as is done on a small
scale today in Gibraltar, Aden and Bermuda Dockyard,
as well as at all stations operated by the Dominion
and Colonial governments. (Gibraltar Archival Docu-
ment, 1924)
By the Committee’s logic, if W. T. stations went unused,
they would become worn down and thus useless for
the next war—“the next war” being a popular theme
in British military rhetoric and history (Robbins, 1996).
But the logic here is inherently capitalist. Depreciating
machinery at rest directly reduces the potential for cap-
ital, noting that the industrial slump and degradation
of factory production capacities were one of the princi-
ple drives of World War I in Gibraltar and Great Britain
(Caruana, Rockoff, & National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 2006). If left unused, the telegraphy machinery
would neither be able to repay its cost, nor generate the
surplus needed for maintenance before going obsolete.
Thus, the logic at work here is that it was better to priva-
tize the telegraphy machinery and receive some return
on investment than for the state to become “a prisoner
of his investment” (Landes, 1969). And so, it was rea-
soned that the state should find ways for private groups
to manage telegraphy during peacetime—a pivotal mo-
ment in the privatization of nationalized infrastructure—
and that the admiralty could hypothetically re-seize the
means of communication in Gibraltar in future war ef-
forts with minimal investment. Notably, the admiralty
would continue to control and maintain the cable lines
in and out of Gibraltar, but colonial government would
leave the telegraphy business.
As a result, the Eastern Telegraph Company con-
trolled all telegraphy service, save for communication be-
tween the Admiralty, Colonial Government, and British
State. Their demands on the military, as the owner of
the infrastructure, had become quite costly. However,
Eastern Telegraph Company’s heavy use of the infrastruc-
ture, and their constant needs for repair, was far less
than the cost the Empire would endure to replace out-
dated and depreciated machinery in the event of an-
other war. Where the state hoped to privatize the com-
munication infrastructure with the intent of simply re-
appropriating it for the next armed conflict, at little cost
to the state, Eastern Telegraphy Company refused to pur-
chase the outmoded infrastructure. Instead, they relied
on the state to technologically facilitate their constant at-
tempts to generate profit.
As a colony tasked with connecting the whole
of the Eastern and Southern British Empire through
W. T., Gibraltar was thrust into the international-turning-
global telecommunications infrastructure. However, the
metropole-run telegraphy service was not simply a part
of a network of global communication, but simultane-
ously a competitor. In 1925, a letter from the Post Mas-
ter General to the Post Master of Gibraltar states that
the State-owned transatlantic message cables were not
receiving any commercial traffic from the colonies, “de-
spite connecting Great Britain with the rest of the world
more or less. In many countries, the Imperial cable ser-
vice does not even appear on maps and message routes”
(Gibraltar Archival Document, 1925). In Gibraltar, civil-
ians and military personnel alike were drawn to the
cheaper and more reliable commercial service being of-
fered by private companies in Spain. This cost the British
W. T. companies considerable money, as official gov-
ernment use of the transatlantic line was free in ex-
change for friendly regulations of commercial W. T. ven-
tures. This telecommunication-oriented connection to
the world, however, is not simply a participating in a
global network, but the insertion into a global commu-
nications regime.
In 1927, both the British state and various British pri-
vate commercial enterprises took part in theWashington
International Radiotelegraph Convention—the first con-
vention in which International Radiotelegraph and Tele-
graph Conventions were fused. 80 countries and 52 pri-
vate companies sent representatives to the convention,
making it the largest since the formation of both origi-
nal conventions.
While there were numerous treaty articles with sub-
stantial impact on theway telegraphywas operated glob-
ally, the most substantial article was one that dictated
the grounds of participating in the international wire-
less community, entitled “Article 7: Connexion with the
General Communications System”. In this article, as it
was interpreted by the British secretary of state of the
colonies in a letter to the colonial secretary and admiralty
in September 1929, colonies would no longer be allowed
to participate in international radiotelegraph telecom-
munications under the banner of their mother country;
Gibraltar would no longer be represented by, and af-
forded access through, Great Britain (Gibraltar Archival
Document, 1929b). This left colonies like Gibraltar with
two options: either pay an undisclosed sum of money to
becomeaparticipating country—anamountwell outside
the means of Gibraltar according to a response from the
colonial secretary; or, should these countries wish to re-
main connected, they would be required to contract all
of their commercial telecommunications needs to a pri-
vate company that held a position in the organization, all
of which were part of a mutually beneficial cartel (Win-
seck & Pike, 2007). Even if these colonies bought into
the system, they would still be denied a vote; instead,
their voting would be represented by the one voted allot-
ted to their respective metropole. This regulation, it ap-
pears in the proceedings of the conference, were done in
fear that Britainwould strong-arm its colonies into voting
to Great Britain’s benefit (and the possible loss of other
countries lacking the colonial influence of the Empire).
Gibraltar would pay large sums of money, but would yet
be denied any form of independent participation (Gibral-
tar Archival Document, 1930a).
All those colonies of the British, French, German,
Spanish, Dutch and Portuguese who did not have the
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monetary means to participate as a state would have
their infrastructure sold—by the metropole, no less—to
a private company. Such was the case in Gibraltar, where
the privatization of telecommunications infrastructure
was an articulation of the need to participate in the
global economy and the crumbling British Empire. Recov-
ering fromWorldWar I, Britain began struggling to main-
tain the capital to both refurbish its Royal Navy and fund
colonial administration (Broadberry & Harrison, 2009).
In 1934, seven years following Article 19 the Admiralty
in Gibraltar responded that it would not pay into this
system. “We are part of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain, allotted one vote and thus willing only to pay
once” (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1934c). The Admi-
ralty, with its aristocratic officers, would fold neither to
the “lesser” aristocrats put in charge of colonial manage-
ment at home or abroad, nor to the Liberals with no
claim to title.
However, the Admiralty’s protest had come years too
late: the government-controlled commercial service had
been sold by the metropole and incorporated in 1929
in order to meet the interpretations of the convention,
among other reasons. A letter from the secretary of
state of the colonies to the colonial secretary in August
1929 states:
That the arrangements for the fusion of the Princi-
pal British cable and wireless interests and the trans-
fer to the Company so formed of the greater part of
the governmental activities of this kind in the United
Kingdomhave now been completed. Themerger com-
pany (Cables andWireless Limited) and the communi-
cations company (Imperial and International Commu-
nications Limited) were formally incorporated on the
8th of April last and the Agreement between the Com-
panies and the Governments concerned was signed
on the 29th of May 1929. (Gibraltar Archival Docu-
ment, 1929c)
The Admiralty would still control the government-owned
and operated service, as well as have the power to
overtake the commercial system in times of war would
it have been necessary—as would be the case in
smaller colonies like that of Gibraltar and the Falk-
land Islands. Commercial interests, however, now be-
longed purely to Cable and Wireless LTD, including na-
tional communiques:
They will at all times during the continuance of this
Agreement maintain an efficient and regular commu-
nications service between all those parts and places
in the British Empire heretofore served by the vari-
ous communications services to be acquired by them
and will not without the consent of the Advisory Com-
mittee sell, lease, charge, or otherwise dispose of
any property rights or assets of the Company for the
time being used for the purposes of communication
between the parts and places aforesaid otherwise
than in the ordinary course of administration or man-
agement or for the purpose of replacing worn-out,
disused, or obsolete plant. (Gibraltar Archival Docu-
ment, 1929a)
Great Britain, again according to the story told by this
one archive, had decided that, to best control its com-
munications interests, it would sell the telegraphic in-
frastructure that connected all of its colonies to a British
company, lest the colony be exploited by some other na-
tional entity other than the British.4 The decision was
such: As part of a British private holding, the telegraphic
industry would pay taxes and be under the control of
the British government; otherwise, as independent coun-
tries exercising their rights in the international conven-
tion, the colonies would command more power against
the metropole. Further, the metropole would maintain
some “control” over the privatized company by provid-
ing subsidized labor and protecting its ability to thrive as
a private entity (i.e., protect its ability to compete).5
If telegraphy had been governed by the DORA during
thewar, telegraphywould be governed by perceptions of
the global economy in the post-war period. If the DORA
was a means of asserting the state’s control over the
process of telegraphy, then the international regulations
asserted the British State’s control over the profitability
and commerciality of communications in Gibraltar. This
shift was from control over infrastructure to control over
profitability, or more clearly from power to profit. The
British state did so through the privatization of infrastruc-
ture, much to the chagrin of Gibraltar’s admiralty and
colonial administrators. At its core, the privatization of
telegraphy in Gibraltar is a case of global superpowers
like Great Britain attempting to absorb money from the
colonies, developing the superpower metropolitan’s in-
frastructure on the material and financial backs of the
colonial periphery. To the administrators and admiralty
in Gibraltar, this pivot was done on their backs.
4. Private Telegraphy, Public Inconvenience
I am instructed to offer your company accommoda-
tion in the General Post Office, Main Street, Gibraltar
at an inclusive rental of £100 per annum. The Govern-
ment undertake to carry out all the necessary alter-
ations and additions, and I forward you herewith two
4 AsWinseck and Pike (2007) argue, telegraph entrepreneurs rarely if ever displayed the form of jingoism projected on them by parliamentary advocates.
5 Simultaneously, Marconi’s wireless telegraphy company demanded that states privatize the telegraphy industry in exchange for “free” hardware instal-
lation, gainingmuch ground throughout Europe. Therewas a great deal of fear that this service, if given the chance, would buy out thewhole of Europe’s
telecommunications and disrupt and usurp imperial communication. “The president of the [Radiotelegraphy] conference, in his opening remarks, stated
that the development of radio, which was still in its infancy, would be unduly hampered by any attempt to monopolize facilities and that, therefore,
rules should be made to block any attempt to impose one system upon others. His attack was made directly at the Marconi Company, and the Marconi
Company’s restrictive practices were cited as an example of an attempt to force one system on all the world” as cited in George Codding Jr. (1972).
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copies of the plan showing the nature of the proposed
alterations &c. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1933a)
Having gutted the public service of telegraphy, Cable &
Wireless LTD existed parasitically on the back of another
public system in Gibraltar: the postal service. The post
office served simultaneously as competition and sacrifi-
cial offering to the privatized W. T. industry in Gibraltar.
And in doing so, incensed the defenders of the colonial
state in Gibraltar. Importantly, this problemwas one that
plagued the entirety of the British Empire. As Wireless
World reported in 1918, the conflict between Marconi
wireless and the Post Office was so intense that it ap-
peared to be littered with conspiracy, affairs, spies, plots,
and secret documents more the making of Jacobite con-
spiracies and war fantasy, than the type of catalog ex-
pected of British history (Wireless World, 1918).
In the 1930’s, the postal service and savings bank ex-
isted as a paired institution in Gibraltar, with post being
sent from the same counters and by the same individ-
uals who were enlisted as bankers. This pairing started
in Great Britain in 1861 by Sir Rowland Hill and William
Gladstone, who saw it as a cheap way to finance pub-
lic debt—particularly through war bonds in the 1920’s
(Kelsey, 2004). The colonial secretary’s notes in August
1925 describes merchants complaining to the secretary
of state of Foreign Affairs about profits garnered from
the banking system by the State (Gibraltar Archival Doc-
ument, n.d.). Their principle complaint: that the public
debt held by the postal bank was of little to no benefit,
or investment, to Gibraltar itself. The Colonial Adminis-
tration’s answer to this was, quite simply, to raise the
postage fee to increase the funds available for Gibraltar—
not redirect the spending to minimize debt. This caused
further concern by the local merchants, who began ad-
vocating for a privatized postal service and against the di-
rect and/or indirect taxations that would “reduce” their
“hard earned profits”. These merchants suggested that
the government was devaluing the commercial opportu-
nity through its monopoly over communication. While it
would have been simple to convert and privatize teleg-
raphy, the privatization of telegraphy in 1929 posed a
threat to national security: the largely immigrant citi-
zenry of Gibraltar would hold the capacity to send mes-
sages out of Gibraltar at a far cheaper rate with far less
surveillance than they were able to send postage out
of Gibraltar. The decrease in postal profits would make
it near impossible to pay interest to account holders
through the bank, and discourage diverse ways of reduc-
ing the danger of investing those funds and enticing sav-
ings holdings.
As the postal service began to compete against the
newly privatized Cable & Wireless, LTD for state money
and support to meet its obligations, so too did the postal
office begin competing for space. In 1933, Imperial and
International Communications LTD—the privatized com-
pany renamed—began talks to move into the post office.
In a letter to the administration, the publicmanager of IIC
LTD described the ways in which the military interferes
with the work necessary of a private company, and si-
multaneously of the lack of space in Gibraltar to establish
enough space to perform the tasks required of them by
a telegraph-hungry public (Gibraltar Archival Document,
1933b). Overall, the letters between London investors,
the Admiralty, and colonial secretary reflect a concern
for Gibraltarians’ “access” to W. T., as well as a concern
that the accessibility of the postal service’s greater acces-
sibility would prove problematic for the newly privatized
telegraphy company. The move of Cable and Wireless
into the postal office, then, should not be understood
as integration into the public economy, but rather the
use of the public economy to support and develop the
private enterprise of W. T., and the state’s implicit prepa-
ration for divesting the public economy.6 The capitalist
city council understood the steps towards divestment as
a sign of the government “regulating” its monopolistic
tendencies, protecting the competition distinctive of a
“free market”.
Cable &Wireless LTD beganworking out of the postal
office on 1 June 1934 (Gibraltar Archival Document,
1934a). To accommodate the company, the postal of-
fice shrank its offices, reconfigured multiple counters,
and agreed on a joint managerial relationship between
the government and the company workers. Two months
later, the manager sent a letter requesting that a sign be
placed outside the post office to mark the newly estab-
lished telegraph office—which had otherwise been over-
looked (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1934b).
By this time, however, governance of Gibraltar had
changed so radically that approval was not just in the
hands of the colonial secretary, but also an elected
city council composed mostly of local business-owners
(Archer, 2006). The city council approved the sign post-
ing with no debate, enthused by the private alternatives
to state services being offered.
By February 1936, the Colonial postmaster asked for
a reduction in Cable & Wireless’ space, as its business
had come to dominate the postal office to the point of
legitimating the addition of a sign (Figure 2, Gibraltar
Archival Document, 1936a). As the W. T. business ex-
panded in 1933, the Colonial postmaster gave up his of-
fice “in the public interest”. As part of theWorldWar I ef-
fort to make government efficient, the Colonial postmas-
ter had been given residence in the Postal Office, where
he was forced to work and sleep for the time being. As
space became an issue, Cable&Wireless asked for him to
give up—ormove—that space too. In a letter fromMarch
1936, themanager of Cable&Wirelessmade two sugges-
tions, based on avoiding a rewiring of the entire building
for providing “adequate” telegraphic power: first, Cable
and Wireless could return the upstairs southerly room
for the Postmaster’s quarters for a reduction of £25 per
6 Private economy, here, refers to capitalists and business services outside of state ownership and regulation, while the public economy refers to those
services and businesses that both provide essential services and are subsidized by the state (Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990).
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Figure 2. Proposed hanging sign for post office branch of imperial cable and wireless (1934).
annum, or give up the downstairs southerly room for a re-
duction of £40 per annum (Gibraltar Archival Document,
1936b). Neither, however, proved satisfactory to the
postmaster general. Both rooms were plagued by both
the noise of vehicles in the street and the noise of teleg-
raphy, and that clatter was conducive to neither sleeping
nor working (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1936c).
This moment marked an attempt to gain space back
from privatized telegraphy industry on the part of the
colonial administration—manned by aristocratic retirees
of the admiralty. In a letter dated November 1940, the
Colonial postmaster wrote to the Manager of Cable and
Wireless. Cable and Wireless was occupying its previ-
ous location next door to the post office in addition
to its postal facilities, and the post master was noti-
fying him that the post office would thus reserve all
counter space for parcel operations (Gibraltar Archival
Document, 1940b). However, the Manager of Cable and
Wireless responded promptly, sending a copy to the city
council as well.
My clerical staff at present occupy part of the An-
chor Line offices and not our former premises as you
suggest, and, to the best of my knowledge, my com-
pany has not considered the question of vacating the
General Post Office….It is hardly necessary to point
out that throughout the past year our counter traf-
fic has increased to an extent not contemplated when
the move to the General Post Office was made and it
seems very probable that this traffic will continue for
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some time, providing it is possible to maintain a cable
office in town. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1940c)
The colonial postmaster’s frustration would only con-
tinue to grow, as would the antagonistic behavior of Ca-
ble and Wireless LTD. On December 1940, Cable and
Wireless took out an advert in theGibraltar Chronicle fun-
neling its holiday traffic to the post office, “inviting the
public to hand in telegrams to the Company Offices at
theGeneral Post Office” (Figure 3). The advertisement fo-
cused two spaces worth of customers—Cable and Wire-
less LTD was running another office on Barracks Road
at the same time—into the small, already over-occupied
space of the post office. In a letter to the manager of
Cable and Wireless, dated December 1940, the Colonial
postmaster responded to both the advertisement and
the increased traffic.
The position today is that the Cable Company’s cus-
tomers are so numerous and the congestion is such
that inconvenience is experienced by those having le-
gitimate postal business to transact: e.g. Post Office
customers wishing to prepare money order requisi-
tions, Savings Bank withdraws and Parcel Post Cus-
tomsDeclarations find all space at the Post Officewrit-
ing tables and benches occupied by Cable Company’s
customers engaged in the construction of telegrams;
and post office customers instead of being able to
avail themselves of the facilities provided by this De-
partment for their use are obliged to fill in their forms
at the public counter thereby congesting that section
of the office which is reserved for public business. In
these circumstances…it was agreed that the public
should have reasonable access to that portion of the
counter provided for the Company’s uses not contem-
plated that the increase in the cable company’s traf-
fic would prove to be embarrassing to this administra-
tion. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1940d)
While this struggle between private and public service
was occurring, World War II began having dire effects
on Gibraltar. As funding became tighter within the war-
loan torn British government, still reeling as it was from
WorldWar I, public infrastructure was reduced and priva-
tized. Surely, given the antagonism between the colonial
postmaster and imperial wireless manager, it was then
no trouble for the Colonial postmaster to write the man-
ager of Cable andWireless to note the decrease in Postal
Office hours instituted in response to government aus-
terity orders. According to the Colonial postmaster, the
Postal Office would open at 0900, close at mid-day, re-
open at 1500 hours, and close at 1700 hours—a total of
4–5 hours of open time a day (Gibraltar Archival Docu-
ment, 1940e). Incensed, the manager of Cable andWire-
less responded that the decision was “detrimental to the
people of Gibraltar”. The demand for telegraphy services,
he argued, had increased because the colonial govern-
ment continued to introduce more people (troops) into
Gibraltar, despite having just forced thousands of people
out (evacuated Gibraltarians). Throughout the letter, he
implies that “government” had lost its guiding purpose,
and that it was now private business that must look after
the welfare of the people—whom, for the state, are de-
fined as citizens and for Cable andWireless were defined
as consumers. Responding to the manager’s anger, the
Colonial postmaster suggested that they are not closing
Cable andWireless out, that Cable andWireless was wel-
come to perform tasks in the building, but that the front
Figure 3. Cable & wireless ad (16 December 1940). Source: Gibraltar Chronicle (1940, p. 3).
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doors and hall would be closed to the public during those
hours. This decision, the Post Master continues, is not a
restriction, but a form of austerity expected of Britons in
wartime (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1941a).
The Manager’s complaints did not go unheard, how-
ever. The city council, made of prominent business peo-
ples in Gibraltar who, as described earlier, had advocated
for a privatized alternative to the postal service, would
vote to subsidize the expenses of Cable and Wireless
maintaining hours during the closure of the Postal Of-
fice. The city council funded the installation of a grille in
front of the counters of the Postal Office, so as to pro-
tect it from potential theft (Gibraltar Archival Document,
1941b). Otherwise, the hall of the postal office would re-
main open and available for the Company’s customers.
This is not the only time the privatized service was
rescued by the city council and colonial government.
Between 1930 and 1940, Gibraltar received the news
about the empire increasingly through telegraph. These
began to include updates of Rugby scores “on the mo-
ment”, as well as emergency news regarding the Em-
pire’s various military endeavors (Gibraltar Archival Doc-
ument, 1939). Furthermore, individuals began purchas-
ing private W. T. installations to take part in experiments
around the broadcast of musical performances and indi-
vidual messages. This provided a great challenge to Ca-
ble andWireless LTD’smonopoly on transcontinental and
colonial–metropole information exchange, particularly in
Gibraltar. In March 1940, the head of the Imperial Com-
munications Advisory Committee—a London-based com-
mittee established at the merger and privatization of all
W. T. companies—sent a letter regarding both practices:
Whilst foreign countries I am unable to intervene, I do
ask, in view of the recommendation of the Commit-
tee who dealt with the Empire Rate Scheme, that the
countries of the Empire will prevent this invasion into
the telecommunications field proper to this company
by newspapers, news agencies, and other unautho-
rized bodies. (Gibraltar Archival Document, 1940a)
Reuters was the sole source of news on the wire. While
starting independently, however, by 1940 it was fully
owned by the Press Association, an organization of the
provincial press of Great Britain (Crisell, 2002). In short,
it was a private service that had returned to public own-
ership, just as telegraphy had done half a century ear-
lier. What remains in the tone of the Manager’s letter
is a fear that the functions of a public company are be-
ginning to seep into the cable business; Cable & Wire-
less was expected to carry the news wire, and not given
the option to refuse. Seeing a potential road to the re-
nationalization of wireless, Cable & Wireless turned to
the government(s) of the empire, notably Gibraltar in
this instance, to ask for protection against the public
economy—news and information provided to citizens
to imagine a nation—coming to dominate the private
economy—services provided to “desiring” and “paying”
consumers. In response, the colonial secretary refocused
the newswire to the military W. T.; however, he did main-
tain private citizens’ rights to own W. T. systems (Gibral-
tar Archival Document, 1040a). And while this was some
protection from the so-called evils of nationalization at
a local scale, they would be rendered moot when Ca-
ble and Wireless LTD became nationalized by the Labour
Party in 1947.
5. Conclusion: Privatization, Perspectivism, and the
Coming Neoliberal Moment
The above is not the history of telegraphy, so much as
a perspective on the history of telegraphy enshrined by
the Gibraltar Archives. From this perspective, W. T. in
Gibraltar was the site of a complicated and shifting re-
lationship between metropole and colony, between gov-
ernor and admiralty, and between State and private en-
terprise. Installed initially to enable faster communica-
tion among armed forces, the perfect storm of interwar
economy and crumbling empire pushed Britain to sell
off Gibraltar’s telegraphic infrastructure. The result was
a private business that relied on the state to protect it
from nationalization, recruiting domestic cabinet mem-
bers in the UK to wage ideological and economic war
against their lesser kinsmen that held outposts in the
colony itself. The Gibraltar Archives represent the voices
of an often forgotten resistance to the privatization of
public communication infrastructure, namely the voice
of an anti-Liberal colonial administration doing the work
of managing and building Empire.
According to this archive, then, W. T. in pre-World
War II Gibraltar was the site of a complicated and shift-
ing relationships between colonial governor, admiralty,
and private enterprise. Installed to enable faster commu-
nication between the armed forces of the empire, the
perfect storm of a failing interwar economy and crum-
bling empire pushed Britain to sell off Gibraltar’s tele-
graphic infrastructure. The result was a private business
that relied on the state to protect it from nationalization,
whether that nationalizationwas the threat of the state’s
“monopolistic tendencies” (Hayek, 2005), or the threat
of government take over amidst declines in consumer
appreciation and participation. Thus, contra a world sys-
tems theory that posits economic models coming from
the core and exported to the periphery, I am arguing that
the neoliberal mode of production was a material con-
dition formulated in the colony before returning to the
metropole as a systemic relationship facilitated through
privatization—long before it was a formulated economic
rationality to be deployed in that very metropole. This
argument is not to suggest that Gibraltar was the birth-
place of neoliberalism; but rather, that what is narrated
as a post-World War II political economic rationality in
Europe has deeply set imperial roots as part of a long,
colonial history of neoliberal transformation.
Opening that argument out to the present, it be-
comes clear that the contemporary neoliberalmoment—
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wrapped as it is in struggles over the privatization of pub-
lic infrastructure—did not spring forth from Athena-like
from the post-1968 world. Rather, neoliberalism is the
colonial formation of a type of capitalism that, at very
least, played out in the telegraphy economy of Gibraltar
(and undoubtedly in countless other places), hidden in
the strata of world history. Whether we’re speaking of
Atlee’s and then Thatcher’s British government, or the
policy and institution shifts in the US driven by Lewis
Powell’s 1971 US Chamber of Commerce memo or the
policies put into place by Ronald Raegan’s administra-
tion (Harvey, 2007), each pulled its models for economic
change from the modes of production that made the
pivot from colonialism to imperialism possible.
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